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Abstract
The number of people who receive a stable income for life from a closed pooled annuity
fund is studied. Income stability is defined as keeping the income within a specified
tolerance of the initial income in a fixed proportion of future scenarios. The focus is on
quantifying the effect of the number of members, which drives the level of idiosyncratic
longevity risk in the fund, on the income stability. To do this, investment returns
are held constant and systematic longevity risk is omitted. An analytical expression
that closely approximates the number of fund members who receive a stable income is
derived and is seen to be independent of the mortality model. An application of the
result is to calculate the length of time for which the pooled annuity fund can provide
the desired level of income stability.
Keywords: Longevity credit; decumulation; tontine; unsystematic risk; pooling.
1. Introduction
The lack of innovative products to convert a lump-sum into a life-long retirement income is increas-
ingly seen as a problem in the United Kingdom (Work and Pensions Committee, 2018, Paragraph
12, page 10). Previously, pension savers typically either bought a life annuity from an insur-
ance company or saved within a defined benefit pension scheme. With the former option rather
unattractive for those with smaller pension pots due to low annuity rates (caused by low investment
returns, uncertainty about future lifespans and solvency capital requirements) and the latter be-
coming less available due to the closing of defined benefit pension schemes, there is an opportunity
for attractive, alternative ways to convert savings into an income for life.
Pooled annuity funds, a type of tontine, are an alternative which offer the opportunity of a
lifelong, stable income to its participants. They pool the retirement wealth of their participants
and pay it out to the survivors as a regular income. They should give a higher income than under
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self-insurance (also called income drawdown in UK terminology), for the same chance of exhausting
funds. They can do this because they pool the participants’ longevity risk, and hence subsidize
the payments to the longer-lived members, and they do not pay a bequest to the participants’
beneficiaries. It is the same principle underpinning life annuities. The critical difference is that the
income from a conventional life annuity product is guaranteed by an insurance company whereas
that from a pooled annuity fund is not guaranteed by anyone. The income from a pooled annuity
fund will vary due to fluctuations in investment returns and longevity experience, unlike those of
a conventional life annuity, which gives a constant income regardless of investment and longevity
experience.
In this paper a mathematical expression is derived which allows the calculation of a lower bound
on the number of participants who receive a stable, life-long income once the degree of income
volatility is specified. A numerical study suggests that the lower bound is close in value to the true
value. By keeping investment returns constant and not including systematic longevity risk (the risk
that the wrong distribution of future lifetime has been chosen), the risk attributable to idiosyncratic
longevity risk (the risk that the distribution of future lifetime is not observed perfectly among the
annuitants) is studied in isolation. This is important since the raison d’eˆtre of joining the fund
for individual participants - a stable income paid for life - is reliant on idiosyncratic longevity risk
being sufficiently diversified. The analysis in this paper will allow the risk inherent in random
investment returns and systematic longevity risk to be quantified and attributed separately in
further research. Importantly, the derived results give us the insight that the proportion of people
who receive a stable, life-long income is approximately independent of the mortality model, once
the number of members initially in the fund is fixed.
Tontines have enjoyed recently some attention in the academic literature. Piggott et al. (2005)
proposed Group Self-Annuitization, which is the structure studied here. In it, the income paid to
the annuitants is calculated from their individual fund values and annuity factors. The income
calculated for each annuitant should be payable for life as long as both the investment and mortality
experience turn out as assumed in the annuity factors. Group Self-Annuitization is similar to the
Pooled Annuity Fund introduced in Stamos (2008), although the latter does not specify how income
is withdrawn from their structure, but lets income be withdrawn as the annuitant desires. These
structures are designed to operate when all annuitants are independent and identical copies of
each other. The same membership assumption is made in this paper; indeed, the pooled annuity
fund studied here is that of Piggott et al. (2005) in the homogeneous case. An extension of Group
Self-Annuitization to heterogeneous groups is given in Valdez et al. (2006).
Alternative ways of sharing out the funds in a tontine are proposed by Donnelly et al. (2014)
and Sabin (2010), with the latter further discussed in Forman and Sabin (2015). Their tontines
pay survivors an explicit longevity credit, which represents a share of the funds of the recently
deceased, and the level of income withdrawn is not mandated. In contrast, tontines like those of
Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) use the level of income withdrawn to implicitly distribute the funds
of the deceased among the survivors. Chen et al. (2019) proposes and analyzes a product that is
comprised of a tontine until a fixed age and a deferred life annuity that comes into payment at
the fixed age. Donnelly and Young (2017) propose a tontine product with a minimum guaranteed
payment, and the proposed product is developed and examined further in Chen and Rach (2019).
The question of actuarial fairness - that the expected value of the benefits received should equal
the value of each annuitant’s fund - can arise in a discussion of tontine structures. Some are
actuarially fair only for homogeneous memberships, such as the Group Self-Annuitization and the
Pooled Annuity Fund (as shown in Donnelly 2015). Others are actuarially fair for heterogeneous
memberships, such as those in Donnelly et al. (2014) and Sabin (2010). Milevsky and Salisbury
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(2016) argue instead for actuarial equitability rather than fairness - everyone gets the same expected
value of benefit payments even if it is less than what they put in - and propose a structure to do
this.
Qiao and Sherris (2013) analyze and study how to manage systematic longevity risk in Group
Self-Annuitization structures. Noting that annuity payments decline at older ages if the annuity
factors used to calculate the income withdrawn are based on up-to-date mortality experience, they
suggest a way of sharing systematic longevity risk across cohorts, through an adjustment to the
calculation of Piggott et al. (2005). They do a numerical study of this, calculating the quantiles
of the income distribution at fixed time points.
However, our aim is to study idiosyncratic longevity risk. The mathematical results presented
hold for any mortality model as long as systematic longevity risk is excluded. The evolution of
each sample path of the income is analysed, which permits a precise quantification of the behaviour
of the income streams. Piggott et al. (2005) and Sabin (2010) both consider a particular mortality
model and plot the income amounts, observing that they are more volatile at older ages. Their
conclusions are qualitative and not quantitative. None of these studies defines income stability
and so cannot study it rigorously and generally, as is done here. While one definition of income
stability is proposed in this paper, there are many other possible definitions which may be more
suitable for different needs.
After the operation of the pooled annuity fund is detailed in Section 2, the results in Section
3.1 enable the calculation of the number of people who can receive a life-long, stable income from
the pooled annuity fund. In effect, this is the number of people who die while the desired level of
income is stable. Our results give a lower bound which can be used as an approximation (Section
3.2) to the true number of people. Importantly, the approximation is independent of the mortality
model and thus the numbers calculated hold for any age, sex or other sub-population, once the
fund parameters are fixed.
Determining for how long a pooled annuity fund can pay a stable income to its members from
the theoretical results is studied in Section 4. Finally, an approximation to the lower bound is
presented in Section 5, with the derivation relegated to the Appendix.
2. The operation of the pooled annuity fund
Consider a group of N ≥ 2 individuals who constitute the entire membership of the pooled annuity
fund at time 0. Each member is an independent and identical copy of the rest. No member joins
after time 0 and no member can leave except through death.
2.1. Future lifetime random variables and survival probabilities
The members are each aged x ≥ 0 at time 0. Represent the ith member’s future lifetime from age
x by the real-valued random variable Ti > 0, for i = 1, . . . , N . The random variables T1, T2, . . . , TN
are defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P), are independent and identically distributed and have
a continuous distribution. For each ω ∈ Ω, the order statistics (T(i)(ω))Ni=1 are the increasingly
ordered (Ti(ω))Ni=1, i.e. T(1) ≤ T(2) ≤ · · · ≤ T(N).
The number of individuals observed to be alive at age x+ t is
Lx+t =
N∑
i=1
1[Ti>t], for t ≥ 0,
in which 1A is the zero-one indicator function of the set A ⊂ Ω.
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The empirical survival probability to age x + t + s conditional on being alive at age x + t, for
s, t ≥ 0, is
spˆx+t = Lx+t+s/Lx+t, if Lx+t > 0,
and the assumed true survival probability from age x+ t to age x+ t+ s is
spx+t = P
[
Ti > t+ s
∣∣Ti > t] .
In line with actuarial convention, pˆx+t := 1pˆx+t and px+t := 1px+t. The calculation of longevity
credits paid to survivors in the fund uses the empirical survival probabilities (spˆx+t)s,t≥0, whereas
the calculation of the income withdrawn from the members’ account values relies on the assumed
true survival probabilities (spx+t)s,t≥0.
2.2. The income calculation
Each member of a pooled annuity fund has a fund account with value W (t) ≥ 0 at time t, with
constant W (0) > 0 at time 0. The fund account value changes over time due to investment
returns, income withdrawals and longevity credits, the latter coming from the re-allocation of the
fund accounts of the members who died.
The account values are invested to get a constant effective rate of return R > −1 over each unit
of time.
The income withdrawn from each account by each surviving member is the amount that a fair
life annuity would pay if purchased with the current fund value. Thus the member withdraws an
income of amount
C(t) = W (t)/a¨x+t at t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., (1)
in which
a¨x+t = 1 +
∞∑
j=1
(1 +R)−j jpx+t.
2.3. The longevity credit calculation
The account value at time t + 1 of a member who dies over the time period (t, t + 1] is (W (t) −
C(t))(1 + R). The number of deaths observed over (t, t + 1] is Lx+t − Lx+t+1 and so an amount
equal to (W (t)− C(t))(1 +R)(Lx+t − Lx+t+1) is distributed equally among the Lx+t+1 survivors
observed at time t+ 1. Thus the longevity credit paid at time t+ 1 to each member alive at time
t+ 1 is
M(t+ 1) = (W (t)− C(t))(1 +R)(Lx+t − Lx+t+1)/Lx+t+1, if Lx+t+1 > 0. (2)
If Lx+t+1 = 0 then there is no-one left alive at time t + 1, and the pooled annuity fund ceases to
exist. With no-one left in the fund at time t+1, the account values of those who died over (t, t+1]
would be paid to their estate at time t+ 1.
Immediately after the payment of the longevity credit, the account value at time t + 1 of a
member who is alive at that time is
W (t+ 1) = (W (t)− C(t))(1 +R) +M(t+ 1), for t ≥ 0. (3)
In contrast, the account value of a member who is dead at time t + 1 is zero since the funds of
deceased members are distributed among the survivors.
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Using the identity a¨x+t − 1 = px+t a¨x+t+1/(1 +R) and substituting for M(t+ 1) from equation
(2) and for W (t) and W (t+ 1) from equation (1) into equation (3), shows that the income at time
t+ 1 can be written as
C(t+ 1) = C(t) px+t/pˆx+t, if Lx+t+1 > 0. (4)
Thus fluctuations in the income are caused only by fluctuations in the observed survival probability
pˆx+t against the true survival probability px+t and the level of investment returns do not affect the
fluctuations. This is a consequence of setting the investment returns to be constant and known,
which allows idiosyncratic mortality risk to be studied in isolation. The income in one future
scenario is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: A sample of the income process, shown as black circles, for a fund with initially
N = 1000 members, each aged x = 70 and bringing W (0) = 100 000 units of wealth to the
fund at time 0. Time is measured in months, the mortality model used is the UK-based life table
S1PFL (Continuous Mortality Investigation, 2008) and a uniform distribution of deaths is assumed
between integer ages. The blue horizontal lines indicate the lower and upper income thresholds
(ε1 = ε2 = 0.1). While the plot shows only one sample, for 90% of all samples, the income stays
between the income thresholds until 725 members died. In the sample income process shown, the
income happens to stay within the band after the 725th death.
If idiosyncratic longevity risk is completely diversified in the pooled annuity fund then, for all
t ≥ 0, tpˆx = tpx and it would follow that C(t) = C(0). However, the analysis in this paper focuses
on less-than-perfect pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk. The key investigation is to measure
how well does the income stream (C(t); t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) stay close to the initial amount of income
withdrawn, C(0).
3. The problem
The purpose of the pooled annuity fund is to pay a regular, stable income to the fund’s members
for as long as they live. The level of the initial income withdrawn, C(0), is important since the
stability of the subsequent income withdrawn by the annuitants is measured by reference to it.
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Fix a value ε1 ∈ (0, 1), called the lower threshold parameter, a value ε2 > 0, called the upper
threshold parameter and a value β ∈ (0, 1), called the certainty. The income C(ω, t) at time t > 0
and in future scenario ω is deemed to be stable if C(ω, t) ∈ [(1−ε1)C(0), (1+ε2)C(0)]. The values
(1− ε1)C(0) and (1 + ε2)C(0) are called the lower and upper income thresholds, respectively. The
aim is to measure for how long is the income stable in at least 100β% of the future scenarios.
Denote the number of people who receive an income in the range [(1 − ε1)C(0), (1 + ε2)C(0)] in
at least 100β% of the future scenarios for the whole of their lifetime by kC . Then all participants
receive a stable income with certainty β up to the time of the kCth death. But it is only the kC
annuitants who die first who receive a stable income with certainty β for the whole of their lifetime,
rather than for the first part of their lifetime only.
The motivation for the definition of income stability is that it should be understandable to finance
professionals. The closest definition to ours is the “4% rule”, introduced in Bengen (2001) and
further studied in Guyton (2004), Guyton and Klinger (2006) and Pfau and Kitces (2014). The idea
is to calculate the initial amount of income that can be withdrawn for 30 years, with subsequent
year’s withdrawals adjusted for inflation, such that there is at least a 90% chance of this strategy
being sustainable. In contrast to the probabilistic approach taken here, an alternative approach
can be to maximize the expected value of a function of the income withdrawn. For example, He
and Liang (2013) minimize the discounted expected value of the squared distance of the income
from a target value. Others such as Bruhn and Steffensen (2013), Constantinides (1990), Munk
(2008) and Van Bilsen et al. (2020) are based on habit formation. The latter paper and Curatola
(2017) assume a loss averse investor.
The time when exactly k members have passed away is denoted by the random variable T(k),
the kth order statistic of the future lifetime random variables. Suppose that the maximum integer
k := kC to satisfy
P
[
(1 + ε2)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε1)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
] ≥ β, (5)
in which bT(k)c is the integer part of T(k), is to be determined. Figure 2.1 illustrates a choice of
the income thresholds, with a realisation of the income stream.
In this paper, a close, lower bound to kC is found, which holds for any mortality model that
excludes systematic longevity risk. This surprising independence result is a consequence of the
inverse transform method, which is applied in Theorem 3.1 below. It means that the values of the
lower bound calculated for a choice of ε, β and N remain the same regardless of what distribution
is chosen for T1, T2, . . . , TN . In contrast, calculating the value of kC directly from (5) does require
the choice of a mortality model.
It would be ideal to find an explicit expression for the maximum integer that satisfies (5), rather
than a lower bound on it. Indeed, the exact distribution of the order statistics of T1, T2, . . . , TN
are known (Birnbaum and Lientz, 1969; Cso¨rgo¨, 1965). Unfortunately, they are not amenable to
calculations since their distribution functions are polynomials of degree N , and in a pooled annuity
fund the value of N represents the initial number of members. Thus the value of N is likely to be
in the order of hundreds or more.
Going further, the preferred goal would be to find the maximal integer time t ≥ 1 such that
P [(1 + ε2)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε1)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}] ≥ β.
However, the maximal integer time would depend on a mortality model and would not yield a
general result, like the one in this paper.
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3.1. The main results
Theorem 3.1. Let U(1), U(2), . . . , U(N) be the order statistics of N independent and standard uni-
formly distributed random variables U1, U2, . . . , UN . Similarly, denote the order statistics of the
independent and identically distributed future lifetime random variables (Ti)Ni=1, which have a con-
tinuous distribution, by T(1), T(2), . . . , T(N). Fix constants ε1 ∈ (0, 1), ε2 > 0 and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Then
P
[
(1 + ε2)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε1)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
]
≥P
[
(1− ε1) i−1N + ε1 ≥ U(i) ≥ (1 + ε2)min{i,N−1}N − ε2 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
]
,
in which C(s) is the income at time s that is calculated via equation (1).
Proof. Fix t ∈ N and assume that at least one person is alive at age x + t + 1, i.e. Lx+t+1 > 0.
Starting with equation (4), it follows by induction on t ∈ N that
C(t+ 1) = C(0)
t∏
j=0
px+j
pˆx+j
= C(0) t+1px
t+1pˆx
.
As the joint distribution of T1, T2, . . . , TN is continuous, the set [bT(k)c < T(k), for k = 1, 2, . . . , N ]
has measure one. Noting that spˆx > 0 for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c} on this set and working only on
this set, it follows that[
(1 + ε2)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε1)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
]
=
[
1 + ε2 ≥ spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
]
=
[
inf
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2
]
.
Let both T(N+1) := ∞ and spx/spˆx := 1, if spˆx = 0. Since {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c} ⊂ [0, T(k)) ⊂
[0, T(k+1)), it follows
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
spx
spˆx
≤ inf
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
,
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
spx
spˆx
≥ sup
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
,
and so
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1 ⇒ inf
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1,
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2 ⇒ sup
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2.
Therefore [
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2
]
⊂
[
inf
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈{1,2,...,bT(k)c}
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2
]
.
In summary, [
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2
]
⊂ [(1 + ε2)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε1)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}] .
(6)
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Now the goal is to write the left-hand side of (6) in terms of the order statistics of independent,
standard uniformly distributed random variables. This is done by partitioning [0, T(k)) into inter-
vals [T(i−1), T(i)) and considering the minimum value of spx/spˆx over each sub-interval [T(i−1), T(i)).
The empirical distribution function of the proportion of the initial membership who have died
up to time t ≥ 0 is defined as
FˆN (t) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Ti≤t} =
1
N
max{i : T(i) ≤ t}.
Denote by F the distribution function of the death times T1, T2, . . . , TN . Let (1 − F (s))/(1 −
FˆN (s)) := 1 if 1− FˆN (s) = 0. It follows immediately from the definition of the (empirical) survival
probability that spˆx = 1− FˆN (s) and spx = 1− F (s). Hence
[
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
spx
spˆx
≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
≤ 1 + ε2
]
.
(7)
Let T(0) := 0. As the joint distribution of T1, T2, . . . , TN is continuous, the set [T(i−1) <
T(i), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1] has measure one. In the following, we work on this set only.
Consider an arbitrary time interval, [T(i−1), T(i)). The empirical distribution function FˆN changes
value only when a member dies, namely only at times T(1), . . . , T(N). In particular, for all s ∈
[T(i−1), T(i)), FˆN (s) = FˆN (T(i−1)) = FˆN (T(i)−), the left limit of FˆN at T(i).
As the distribution function F of the death time is an increasing function, it follows that 1−F (s)
is a decreasing function that approaches its infimum over s ∈ [T(i−1), T(i)) at the end of the interval.
Thus, as FˆN (s) is constant over the same interval, the fraction (1−F (s))/(1− FˆN (s)) approaches
its infimum over s ∈ [T(i−1), T(i)) as s approaches T(i). By the continuity of F , F (T(i)−) = F (T(i))
so that
inf
s∈[T(i−1),T(i))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
=
1− F (T(i)−)
1− FˆN (T(i)−)
=
1− F (T(i))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
.
On the other hand, as 1 − F (s) is a decreasing function, it attains its largest value over s ∈
[T(i−1), T(i)) at the start of the interval. Thus the fraction (1−F (s))/(1− FˆN (s)) attains its largest
value over s ∈ [T(i−1), T(i)) at s = T(i−1), i.e.
sup
s∈[T(i−1),T(i))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
=
1− F (T(i−1))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
.
The argument above shows that the infimum of (1− F (s))/(1− FˆN (s)) over s ∈ [0, T(k)) is equal
to the infimum of (1 − F (T(i)))/(1 − FˆN (T(i−1))) over i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and that the supremum
of (1 − F (s))/(1 − FˆN (s)) over s ∈ [0, T(k+1)) is equal to the supremum of (1 − F (T(i−1)))/(1 −
FˆN (T(i−1))) over i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}. In summary,[
inf
s∈[0,T(k))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
≥ 1− ε1
]
=
[
inf
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− F (T(i))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
≥ 1− ε1
]
, (8)
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and, using T(0) := 0,[
sup
s∈[0,T(k+1))
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
sup
i∈{1,2,...,k+1}
1− F (T(i−1))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
sup
i∈{2,3,...,k+1}
1− F (T(i−1))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
sup
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− F (T(i))
1− FˆN (T(i))
≤ 1 + ε2
]
.
(9)
As F is continuous, the random variables Ui = F (Ti) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} are independent and
standard uniformly distributed. Their order statistics, (U(i))Ni=1, are linked to the order statistics
of the future lifetime random variables by the identity
U(i) = F (T(i)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Furthermore, by the definition of the empirical distribution function, FˆN (T(i−1)) = (i− 1)/N , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N with FˆN (T(0)) = FˆN (0) = 0. Let (1− U(N))/0 := 1, then[
inf
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− F (T(i))
1− FˆN (T(i−1))
≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− F (T(i))
1− FˆN (T(i))
≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
inf
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− U(i)
1− (i− 1)/N ≥ 1− ε1
]
∩
[
sup
i∈{1,2,...,k}
1− U(i)
1− i/N ≤ 1 + ε2
]
=
[
(1− ε1) i−1N + ε1 ≥ U(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
]
∩ {(1 + ε2) iN − ε2 ≤ U(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} \ {N}]
=
[
(1− ε1) i−1N + ε1 ≥ U(i) ≥ (1 + ε2)min{i,N−1}N − ε2 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
]
.
Combining the last equation with equations (6)-(9) and taking the probability, the desired result
is obtained.
In the sequel, the focus is on either a symmetric income threshold – representing a desire to avoid
both upside and downside income volatility – or a lower income threshold only – representing a
desire to avoid downside income volatility.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and ε ∈ (0, 1),
P
[
(1− ε) i−1N + ε ≥ U(i) ≥ (1 + ε)min{i,N−1}N − ε for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
]
≥ β. (10)
Then
P
[
(1 + ε)C(0) ≥ C(s) ≥ (1− ε)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
] ≥ β. (11)
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.1 with ε = ε1 = ε2.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and ε ∈ (0, 1),
P
[
(1− ε) i−1N + ε ≥ U(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
] ≥ β. (12)
Then
P
[
C(s) ≥ (1− ε)C(0) for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bT(k)c}
] ≥ β. (13)
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Proof. Apply Theorem 3.1 with ε = ε1, let ε2 ↑ ∞ and observe
(1 + ε2) iN − ε2 = iN − ε2(1− iN ) −→ −∞ for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}.
The motivation for proving the results in Section 3.1 is that, rather than calculating the maximal
integer k := kC satisfying (11), the maximal integer k := kU satisfying (10) can instead be
calculated. The same idea applies for (12) and (13). This has some significant benefits.
The value of kU is independent of the distribution of T1, T2, . . . , TN which, if kU is close in
value to kC , allows general conclusions to be drawn as to the ability of the pooled annuity fund
to diversify longevity risk. Additionally, the calculation of kU , which requires only the sampling of
random variables, is faster than the calculation of kC , which requires the simulation of the income
process in the pooled annuity fund. It is straightforward to show that the calculation of kC requires
the order of (L + N) ×M operations whereas kU takes the order of N ×M operations, where L
is the number of times that the income is calculated from time 0 to the maximum time of the last
death in the fund, in each simulation. (For example, if the income was calculated monthly, the
participants were age 70 at time 0 and lived until at most age 120 then, at most, L = 600 time-steps
are needed in each simulation to calculate the income paid to the surviving participants.)
Therefore, a key question is how close is the lower bound kU to the true value kC? As is shown
next for some chosen mortality models, kU is close enough to kC to use it to make conclusions on
the pooled annuity fund’s ability to diverse idiosyncratic longevity risk.
3.2. How close is kU to kC?
To examine how close kU is to kC , the maximal integers satisfying each of (10) to (13) individually
are calculated; the method for each calculation is described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, and all
simulations were carried out in the statistical software package R.
Figure 3.1, which details the extent to which the relative difference between them improves as
the number of members N initially in the fund increases, shows that kC is quite close to kU . For
example, kC is less than 3% above the value of kU when N = 2 000, and the percentage falls to
2% when N = 4 000 and falls further to about 1% when N = 8 000. These values apply for the
two considered life tables and for the two different starting ages, 50 and 70 years old. The relative
difference falls as N increases, due to kU/N and kC/N converging to one as N increases.
It is seen from Figure 3.1 that the younger group of initially 50-year-olds has a lower relative
error than the older group of initially 70-year-olds. The reason is a technical one. Denote the
distribution function of T1 for the 50-year-olds by F50 and that for the 70-year-olds by F70, with
F50 < F70. This inequality implies that for any y ∈ (0, 1) and any given time grid (ti)i, there are
more indexes i such that F50(ti) < y than there are indexes i satisfying F70(ti) < y. Suppose that
for a sequence of uniform order statistics (U(k))Nk=1, the goal is to check if condition (10) holds until
the kth member. To do this, the condition is checked for all indexes i satisfying F50(ti) < U(k),
and similarly for all indexes i satisfying F70(ti) < U(k). Since for the 70-year-olds there are fewer
indices i to check than for 50-year-olds, the condition is more often fulfilled by the 70-year-olds,
yielding a higher maximal kU for the 70-year-olds. This is true even though the values Fx(ti) are
different for x = 50 and x = 70, since the values are close to each other. The relative differences
are magnified further when N is small, due to the smaller numbers involved.
A closer look at the results displayed in Figure 3.1a shows that the value of the threshold
parameter ε is more important than the value of the certainty β in determining the goodness of
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the approximation. The larger the value of ε, and therefore the wider are the thresholds, the better
is the approximation. For example, when ε = 0.1 and N = 2 000, kC is at most 1% higher than
kU . However, the relative difference increases to 3% when ε = 0.05. The same observations apply
to the other plots in Figure 3.1.
Turning to how these relative differences affect the likely time for which the fund can provide a
stable, life-long income, Figure 3.2 indicates that the difference is at most 10 months. For funds
with at least 2 000 members, using kU instead of kC understates the likely time for which a stable,
life-long income is provided by between 2 to 4 months. An explanation of the likely time is given
in Section 4.
The conclusion is that, since it is a close lower bound, kU can be used as an approximation to
kC . The calculation methods of kU and kC are described next.
3.2.1. Calculation of the maximal number kU
To find the maximal number k := kU that fulfills either (10) or (12), Monte Carlo simulation is
used. The initial number of members in the fund, N , and the certainty β are fixed. As the income
thresholds are symmetric about the initial income, call ε := ε1 = ε2 the threshold parameter. Sup-
pose that M ∈ N sample vectors are generated of the uniform order statistics (U(1), U(2), . . . , U(N)).
Denote themth sample of the uniform order statistics by (u(m)(1) , u
(m)
(2) , . . . , u
(m)
(N)), form ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
For each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, the first integer i := i(m) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} that fails
ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N ≥ u(m)(i) ≥ (1 + ε) min{i,N − 1}/N − ε
is determined and k(m) = i(m)−1 is recorded. If there is no such i(m), then k(m) = N is recorded.
The values (k(m))Mm=1 are considered as samples from a random variable K and are used to
calculate the empirical distribution of K. Finally, the value of kU is calculated as the β-quantile
of this empirical distribution of K. The same method is used to find the maximal number that
fulfills (12). The final calculated value, kU , is the result of 10 million simulations.
Note that the procedure can be implemented efficiently since the sorting of uniform random
variables can be avoided. According to Devroye (1986, f.207), uniform order statistics are ratios
of sums of exponential random variables. More precisely, let (Ei)N+1i=1 be independent Exp(1)-
distributed random variables and define Si =
∑i
j=1Ej for integers 1 ≤ j ≤ N + 1. Then the
distributions of (U(i))Ni=1 and (Si/SN+1)Ni=1 are the same.
Table 3.1 lists the maximal number kU as the number of initial members N increases, for
a selection of values of ε and β, depending on whether either a lower income threshold or a
symmetric lower and upper income threshold are applied. Plotting the maximal numbers (Figure
3.3), it can be seen that the value of kU increases approximately linearly for N ≥ 2 000. The linear
approximation improves as the income thresholds widen (i.e. as ε increases) and as the certainty
β decreases.
3.2.2. Calculation of the maximal number kC
Calculating kC involves a straightforward simulation of M = 10 million sample paths of the income
process, based on monthly time units and applying an appropriate life table. Along the mth sample
path, the maximum value of k(m) satisfying the event in inequality (11) or (13), as appropriate,
is determined. Similar to the calculation above, the value of kC is calculated as the β-quantile of
the empirical distribution of a random variable K, for which (k(m))Mm=1 are the observed samples.
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Figure 3.1: Relative distance of the maximal integer k := kC fulfilling (11) from the maximal
integer k := kU fulfilling (10), i.e. (kC − kU )/kU , as the initial group size increases. The smallest
initial group size is 10. The relative distances are displayed for a selection of values of ε and
β, and are indicated by the smaller symbols. The same calculation is shown for (13) and (12),
respectively, and indicated by the larger symbols. The numbers in the plot state the maximum
value of kC − kU , for each value of N , over the eight different combinations of the values of β
and ε, and whether a lower income threshold only or both income thresholds are included. For
the calculation of kC from (11) and (13), it is assumed that income payments are paid monthly
to survivors, the initial age is either 50 or 70 years old, and the mortality distribution is based on
either the Human Mortality Database’ life table for the UK for 2016 (Human Mortality Database,
2018) or the UK-based life table S1PFL (Continuous Mortality Investigation, 2008).
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Figure 3.2: Additional likely time for which the fund can provide a stable, life-long income when
using the maximal integer k := kC instead of the maximal integer k := kU , as the initial group size
increases. Thus using k := kU understates the time for which the fund can provide a stable, life-
long income by at most 10 months, for the considered life tables and parameters. The assumptions
are the same as in Figure 3.1. An explanation of the likely time is given in Section 4.
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ε = 10% ε = 10% ε = 5% ε = 5%
β = 90% β = 99% β = 90% β = 99%
N kaboveU k
both
U k
above
U k
both
U k
above
U k
both
U k
above
U k
both
U
100 25 21 9 9 6 6 1 1
200 85 70 41 40 28 23 9 9
500 331 285 214 196 155 124 70 67
1000 799 725 610 562 483 397 264 242
2000 1778 1680 1524 1436 1310 1135 857 779
3000 2770 2662 2485 2377 2224 1988 1599 1466
4000 3766 3652 3463 3342 3171 2894 2421 2242
5000 4764 4645 4450 4320 4137 3829 3291 3072
6000 5762 5641 5440 5304 5113 4781 4192 3940
7000 6761 6638 6434 6292 6093 5744 5112 4831
8000 7760 7636 7427 7283 7079 6715 6049 5742
9000 8759 8634 8424 8276 8067 7692 6997 6670
10000 9758 9632 9420 9269 9059 8673 7952 7608
Table 3.1: The values kaboveU and kbothU are the maximal integer k that satisfies (12) and (10),
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: The maximal number of members kU for whom the lifetime income is stable, plotted
against the initial number of members N in the fund, for a selection of threshold parameters ε and
certainties β. The number is calculated from either (12), represented by the larger symbols in the
plot, or (10), represented by the smaller symbols.
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3.3. Discussion of the main results
The purpose of the pooled annuity fund is to pay a stable life-long income to its participants. What
universal features can be noted about its ability to do so, if volatility is due only to idiosyncratic
longevity risk and kU is used as a close approximation to kC? In this section, stability is defined
as the future income payments each being within 100ε% of the initial income C(0) (as in Corollary
3.2). This is equivalent to considering the values of i for which the condition
ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N ≥ U(i) ≥ (1 + ε) min{i,N − 1}/N − ε (14)
holds, in which the upper bound ε + (1 − ε)(i − 1)/N corresponds to the lower income threshold
100(1 − ε)C(0). The lower bound (1 + ε) min{i,N − 1}/N − ε corresponds to the upper income
threshold 100(1 + ε)C(0).
First, note that the distance between the lower and upper bounds narrows as i increases.
Geometrically, considering the bounds as lines, the gradient to the lower bound is higher than
the gradient of the upper bound. Thus as i increases, it may be more likely that a sample of
U(i) ∼ Beta(i,N − i+ 1) (Shorack and Wellner, 2009, pp.97) lies outside of the bounds. To inves-
tigate this possibility further, the bounds and the 0.5% and 99.5% quantiles of the uniform order
statistics are plotted in Figure 3.4 for ε = 0.05. Note that although the support of the distribution
functions of the uniform order statistics is [0, 1], the quantiles indicate the location of the vast
majority (99%) of their possible values.
Figure 3.4 illustrates that the income received at the end of the life of the longest-lived members
is less likely to lie between the upper and lower income thresholds than for the shortest-lived
members. This is seen from Figure 3.4: the 0.5% and 99.5% quantile lines (the uppermost and
lowermost black, dashed lines in the figure) lie inside the bounds (red, solid lines) for the lower
order statistics (i.e. the smaller values of i/N , which denote the shorter-lived members). For larger
values of i/N (denoting the longer-lived members), the quantile lines lie outside the bounds in the
plot. When this occurs depends on the number of people initially in the fund. For N = 200, the
quantiles are seen to fall quickly outside the bounds, as i/N increases (Figure 3.4a). Only about
the first 6 members (i/200 ≈ 0.03) are extremely likely to get a life-long, stable income. As N
increases to 2 000 (Figure 3.4b), it is only for approximately the first 900 members (i.e. the first
800 members; i/2000 ≈ 0.45) that the 0.5% to 99.5% quantiles of U(i) falls outside the bounds.
Note that these values are not the same as the maximal number of members who get a stable,
life-long income with a certainty level of 99%, since they look only at the quantiles at each time of
death, rather than along each possible future scenario.
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Figure 3.4: The symmetric upper and lower bounds on the order statistics, for ε = 0.05 and either
N = 200 or N = 2 000, shown as solid red lines. The 0.5%, 50% and 99.5% quantiles of the ith
uniform order statistic are displayed as dashed black lines. The x-axis values are i/N , rather than
i, so that the domains of the plotted functions are all [0, 1].
The second item to note on the condition (14) is that it fails to hold for the highest values of
i, by virtue of the lower and upper bounds crossing each other. The point at which they cross is
found by solving
ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N = (1 + ε) min{i,N − 1}/N − ε
for i. Setting i = N gives a contradiction (N = N − 1) so assume that i < N to obtain that the
bounds have crossed for each i satisfying
i ≥ N + (1− ε−1) /2. (15)
Since the bounds are independent of the order statistics, in all future states of the world the
following can be observed.
• In view of ε ≤ 1, the right-hand side of the inequality (15) is less than or equal to N . Thus
there is always at least one value of i (i.e. i = N) for which the bounds have crossed. Indeed,
as ε → 1, the right-hand side of the inequality (15) tends to N , which means that the two
bounds cross only as the last member of the fund dies.
• As ε → 0, the right-hand side of the inequality (15) tends to −∞ and the two bounds
cross before any fund member dies. In the limit, no fund member can receive a stable (i.e.
constant) income in any future state of the world, meaning that the choice of β is irrelevant.
• For fixed ε, there are a fixed number of members who are still alive when the bounds have
crossed each other. For example, for ε = 0.05 the longest-lived 10 members do not receive
a stable income for the entirety of their future lifetime in any future state of the world,
regardless of the initial number of members in the fund (since the bounds have crossed for
i ≥ N + (1 − ε−1)/2 = N − 9.5, i.e. i ∈ {N − 9, N − 8, . . . , N}, a set of 10 elements.). The
remaining N − 10 members may or may not receive a life-long income in any particular state
of the world.
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In summary, the longest-lived members are unlikely to receive a stable, life-long income when
a symmetric income threshold is used to define income stability. This is by dint of the narrowing
between the symmetric bounds for the longest-lived members and the distribution of the uniform
order statistics relating to those longest-lived members not concentrating at the same rate. In
fact, as long as ε < 1, the longest-lived members have no opportunity to get a stable income for
the entirety of their future lifetime, in any future state of the world. Nonetheless, they may still
receive a stable income for the majority of their future lifetime.
These observations support the increasing volatility in income for the longest-lived members (in
the last cohort to enter if the fund is an open one), remarked upon in Piggott et al. (2005), Qiao
and Sherris (2013) and Sabin (2010). The results in this paper enable the precise elucidation in
our model of when “increasingly volatile” becomes “too volatile”.
Next turn to the case when income stability is defined as the income lying above a lower income
threshold only. This is equivalent to considering the values of i for which the condition
ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N ≥ U(i)
holds. From Figure 3.4, it appears that the 50% quantile line lies below the upper bound (the upper
solid red line in Figure 3.4; the lower solid red line can be ignored as it represents the redundant
upper income threshold). Considering the mean of the ith order statistic, i/(N + 1), instead of the
median – since it has a simple formula that is amenable to algebra and is not dissimilar in value
(Kerman, 2011) – then
ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N ≥ i/(N + 1) ⇒
i ≤ N + 1 if ε > 1/(N + 1)i ≥ N + 1 if ε ≤ 1/(N + 1).
Thus the means of the N order statistics all lie above the upper bound ε+ (1− ε)(i− 1)/N , if the
income threshold parameter ε ≤ 1/(N + 1). Approximating the medians of the N order statistics
by their means, this means that there is a less than 50% chance of each order statistic lying below
the upper bound.
In summary, the value of ε should not be too small, i.e. it should be at least above 1/(N + 1).
Otherwise, life-long income stability will not be achieved for a substantial proportion of the fund
membership. This comment applies in the presence of either a lower income threshold only or both
income thresholds.
4. Application: determining for how long the fund can provide a
stable income
The time at which the income of a pooled annuity fund becomes unstable – i.e. when the income
no longer lies between the thresholds in at least 100β% of future states of the world – is calculated
in terms of the number of deaths that occur up to that time. However, it is useful to communicate
this as a length of time which represents how long all members receive a stable income with a
specified level of certainty. The members who die before that length of time receive a life-long
stable income, whereas those who die after it receive a stable income for only part of their lifetime.
Since the time at which a specified number of deaths occurs varies in each future state of the
world, an estimate of the time at which it occurs is calculated, which is called the likely time.
This is an approximation of the true time, since the number of deaths used, kU , is calculated by
maximising the left-hand side of inequality (12) over k, rather than maximising that of inequality
(13).
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The calculation of the length of time requires the selection of a mortality law, and the mortality
law matters. For example, the length of time over which the fund is likely to provide a stable
income will increase as mortality lightens (i.e. people live longer).
For example, assume that N = 2 000 members all join the pooled annuity fund at age 70. The
annual income C(m) which they withdraw at time m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} is calculated by dividing their
fund value at time m by the value of a single life annuity calculated at age 70 +m, as described in
Section 2.2. Suppose that the future income is considered stable if it is at least 95% of the initial
income (i.e. lower threshold parameter of ε = 0.05 and no upper threshold parameter), in 90% of
all future scenarios (i.e. certainty level β = 0.9). To determine for how long the fund is likely to
provide a stable income, a two-step calculation is required.
• First, by Monte Carlo simulation (as described in Section 3.2.1) it is calculated that the
highest value of k which satisfies inequality (12) is kU = 1 310.
Then, by inequality (13), all members of the fund get an income of at least 0.95C(0) up to
time bT(1310)c, in at least 90% of future scenarios. As shown in Section 3.2, the maximal
value k := kC that satisfies inequality (13) is about 2% higher than the maximal value
k := kU = 1 310 that satisfies inequality (12) for N = 2 000, for the considered mortality
table. So in reality, kC ≈ 1 338 and thus the stable income is provided for longer than
suggested by kU . Mitigating the small error caused by this under-estimation is that, in the
second step described next, the higher time T(1310) at which 1 310 deaths have occurred is
used, rather than the time bT(1310)c ≤ T(1310).
• Second, calculate at what time is it likely that exactly kU = 1 310 deaths have been observed
in the initial population of 2 000 70-year-olds. This is the problem of finding t that satisfies
tq70 = 1 310/2 000, in which the constant tq70 is the true probability that a 70-year old dies
between age 70 and age 70 + t. Here, t is called the likely time. It is a straightforward task
if one has a life table at hand. For example, assuming that the mortality of each of the 2 000
members initially in the fund follows the UK-based life table S1PFL (Continuous Mortality
Investigation, 2008) and assuming a uniform distribution of deaths between integer ages,
gives that t = 19.4 years.
Note that only small variations of the time of death of the kU th member are expected. This is
because as N becomes larger, the probability density of the kth uniform order statistic tends to a
Dirac delta function. To examine how quickly this happens, the probability that the time of the
kU th death occurs at least d ≥ 0 time units before its likely time of occurrence t, i.e. P[T(kU ) ≤ t−d]
is plotted against d in Figure 4.1, for different choices of N , ε and β and for one mortality law.
Symmetric lower and upper income thresholds are imposed. The figure when only a lower income
threshold is imposed is very similar and is omitted.
For an initial number of members N = 100 in the fund (the thickest lines in Figure 4.1), the
time of the kU th death has a 99% probability of appearing between 2.5 to 3 years below t. For
groups with initially N = 1 000 members, there is a 99% probability that the kU th death appears
at most one year below t. This falls to 0.5 years with N = 10 000 members. The conclusion is that
the likely time t calculated in the second step above is very close to the actual time of the kU th
death when there are at least 1 000 members initially in the fund, being at most one year greater
than the actual time.
Figure 4.2 shows the likely time t that the income is stable, for the same mortality law. The time
increases with N , since more members mean that idiosyncratic longevity risk is more diversified
and thus the income paid from each surviving member’s account is stable for longer. Although the
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rate of increase slows as N increases, the income is stable for quite a long time once the number
of initial members N is at least 2 000. For example, when symmetric lower and upper income
thresholds are imposed, the likely time for which a stable income can be provided with certainty β
increases from 17 years to 25 years as N increases from 2 000 to 10 000, for ε = 0.05 and β = 0.9.
Now turn to the case when there is only a lower threshold imposed in the definition of income
stability. Starting with N = 2 000 members, the income is at least 95% of the initial income (i.e.
ε = 0.05) for nearly 15 years in β = 99% of future states of the world. This lower income stability
extends to almost 20 years if the certainty is dropped to β = 90%. From Figure 4.2 it is seen that
including both an upper and a lower threshold reduces by, at most, 2 years the length of time for
which a fund is likely to provide an income above a lower threshold.
It is also seen from the figure that the threshold parameter ε has a larger effect on the likely
times than the certainty β, for each value of N . For example, for a fund with initially N = 2 000
members, decreasing the threshold parameter ε from 10% to 5% reduces the likely time by up to 7
years, everything else being the same. However, decreasing the certainty level β from 99% to 90%
reduces the likely time by up to 5 years, everything else being the same. These reductions decline
in magnitude as N increases.
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Figure 4.1: P[T(kU ) ≤ F−1(kU/N)− d] plotted against d, in which F (s) = sq70 is calculated using
the UK-based life table S1PFL (Continuous Mortality Investigation, 2008). The plots are shown
for a selection of values of the initial number N of 70-year-old members in the fund, certainties β
and threshold parameter ε and when a symmetric lower and upper income threshold are imposed.
The plot using the Human Mortality Database’s life table for the UK for 2016 (Human Mortality
Database, 2018) looks very similar and is omitted.
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Figure 4.2: The likely length of time for which the fund can provide a stable income for a group
of 70-year-olds, plotted as a function of the initial number of members in the fund N . The plot is
based on the UK-based life table S1PFL (Continuous Mortality Investigation, 2008). The smaller
symbols indicate a symmetric lower and upper threshold on the income, and the larger symbols
indicate a lower threshold only on the income.
Our results also provide evidence to support broadly the statement in Qiao and Sherris (2013,
page 967) that “Most of the significant pooling benefits are realized when the pool size reaches
1 000”; Figure 4.2 indicates a slowing up of the rate of increase of the likely time for which a stable
income can be provided around N = 2 000 (the study of Qiao and Sherris 2013 considered only
N ∈ {1, 100, 1 000, 10 000}). It is important to note that when the number of members who receive
a stable income is considered, there is still a steadily increasing proportion of members who receive
a life-long, stable income, as can be observed from Figure 3.3.
5. Approximate formula
Here an approximate formula to determine the maximum integer k := kU that satisfies inequality
(12) is presented. Fix the initial number of fund members N , certainty β ∈ (0, 1), threshold
parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) and let Φ−1 be the inverse of the standard normal distribution function Φ.
Then
kU ≈ kapproxU := N
1−
 11− ε
1− 1
1 + 1N
( 1−ε
ε
)2 (Φ−1 ( 1−β2 ))2


N
 , (16)
in which bucN = max{i/N : i/N ≤ u and i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}} for u ≥ 0. The derivation is shown in
Appendix A.
Figure 5.1a shows that 1 − kapproxU /N is visually almost indistinguishable from 1 − kU/N on a
scale from 0% to 100%. However, the relative errors reveal small systematic discrepancies. Observe
in Figure 5.1b that the relative errors change most noticeably with the threshold parameter ε, upon
fixing the certainty β. On the other hand, the relative errors are similar for different certainties β,
upon fixing the threshold parameter ε. This indicates that the treatment of ε is the major source
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of error. In fact, in the derivation of the approximation (16), a vague argument that involves ε and
works by compensating one effect with another is employed; see the expressions (17) and (18).
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
initial group size
re
m
a
in
in
g 
%
 b
ef
o
re
 u
n
st
ab
le
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
approximation
exact
ε=10%, β=90%
ε=10%, β=99%
ε=05%, β=90%
ε=05%, β=99%
(a) 100(1− kU/N) versus 100(1− kapproxU /N).
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
initial group size
re
la
tiv
e
 e
rr
o
r 
o
f t
he
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 %
−
4%
−
2%
0%
2%
4%
ε=10%, β=90%
ε=10%, β=99%
ε=05%, β=90%
ε=05%, β=99%
+4
+14+6
+14
−1
−6
−3
−2
(b) (kapproxU − kU )/(N − kU ).
Figure 5.1: Representations of the error in the approximation kapproxU . Figure 5.1a plots the per-
centage of members still alive after the kU th death, i.e. 100(1 − kU/N) and displayed as discrete
symbols, and its approximation 100(1− kapproxU /N), plotted as solid lines, as the initial number of
members N increases. The results are shown for various choices of the certainty β and threshold
parameter ε. Figure 5.1b plots the relative error of these values, which reduces to calculating
(kapproxU − kU )/(N − kU ). The displayed integers inside the graph show the maximal value of
kapproxU − kU in terms of number of members.
More generally, it is possible to apply the same methodology to find an approximate formula to
determine the maximum integer k := kU that satisfies
P
[
(1− ε1) i−1N + ε1 ≥ U(i) ≥ (1 + ε2)min{i,N−1}N − ε2 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
]
≥ β.
However, the result involves a special function that is as inexplicit as the target function, and we
give it only for completeness:
kU ≈ kapproxU := N bΨ−1ε1,ε2,N (β)cN
with
Ψε1,ε2,N (y) := P
−√N ε21+ε2 ≤ infs≤ 1(1+ε2)(1−y)−1W (s); sups≤ 1(1−ε1)(1−y)−1W (s) ≤
√
N ε11−ε1

for all y ∈ (0, 1) and W a standard Brownian motion.
6. Conclusion
Here a pooled annuity fund has been analyzed to see how well it provides a stable income to its
participants, with a specified degree of certainty. Income stability is defined path-wise. The main
theoretical result is the derivation of a lower bound that can be used as a good approximation to
the true number of members. The lower bound gives both insights and a greater understanding of
the pooled annuity fund’s ability to diversify idiosyncratic longevity risk:
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• It is independent of the mortality distribution of the fund members. As the lower bound is
close to the true value, it suggests that the true number of members is unlikely to change
much if the mortality distribution is varied, all other parameters being unchanged.
• It can be calculated faster than the true number, since the former requires only the simulation
of the order statistics of independent, standard uniform random variables rather than a time-
dependent stochastic simulation.
• When a stable income is defined as the income lying between a symmetric upper and non-
zero lower income threshold, the longest lived members do not receive a stable income in any
future state of the world. Even if such members may receive a stable income for the majority
of their lifetime, this means that there should be an alternative method of providing a stable
income with a desired degree of certainty for the entirety of their lifetime, for example by
using deferred life annuity contracts or the opportunity to exit the fund at a certain age
or the modifications proposed in, for example, Chen et al. (2019), Chen and Rach (2019)
and Donnelly and Young (2017). This is an insight into the failure of the diversification of
idiosyncratic longevity risk for the longest lived members.
The main theorem quantifies the number of members required to give the desired degree of income
stability. In other words, the number of members needed to diversify idiosyncratic longevity risk
to a specific degree. At a high-level, the results suggest that the membership of the fund should
number in the thousands if it is important to reduce the income instability derived from longevity
risk pooling to low levels. Our finding complements the results of Qiao and Sherris (2013), who
suggest the same order of magnitude based on examining the quantiles of the income. However,
our results allow the calculation of the precise number of members required and, moreover, use a
path-wise definition of income stability. This means that we know how the income streams have
behaved up to the time that the calculated number of people die, rather than only how they behave
at one point in time.
Applying the theoretical results, the length of time for which the pooled annuity fund could
provide a stable income with a specified degree of certainty was determined. Again, the length of
time depends on how income stability is specified. It also depends on a mortality law; the results
for one law are presented. Based on the chosen mortality law, the fund can provide a stable income
from 10 years to 30 years depending on the specification of income stability and the initial number
of members in the fund. Finally, an approximation to the lower bound is derived, and is found to
be a close approximation to it.
The limitations of the assumptions made in this paper motivate future research into this area. It
is assumed that all annuitants join with the same amount of money and are the same age. While
it would be possible to impose such restrictions in real life, it is overly prescriptive and makes the
continued success of the pooled annuity fund less likely. All annuitants are assumed to have the
same chance of dying at each age. How well this approximates reality will depend on the group of
annuitants; it would be unrealistic if anyone was allowed to join but may be appropriate for a fund
offered only to university professors, for example. Deaths are assumed to occur independently, but
this may not be true if annuitants catch a deadly virus from each other. These restrictions on the
characteristics of the fund membership could be relaxed in future research.
The historical record of actuaries under-estimating future lifetimes and the fast spread across
the world of the coronavirus both suggest that the distribution of the annuitants’ future lifetimes
assumed in the model is unlikely to be observed in practice. How the inclusion of systematic
longevity risk affects the results very broadly is discussed briefly here. Suppose that the day after
22
the fund started, the future lifetime distribution of the annuitants was found to understate for how
long the annuitants would live. Assume for simplicity that the definition of stability includes only
a lower income threshold.
While the income paid to the annuitants would be consequently revised downwards, the number
kU who would receive the stable version of this new income for life would be unchanged (assuming
no further updates to the future lifetime distribution are needed). This is because kU is independent
of the choice of the future lifetime distribution, but it requires that this distribution is the one
observed in practice. This would be the case if the distribution changed the day after the fund
started, and never changed subsequently.
However, suppose that the understatement of future lifetime was not discovered while the fund’s
annuitants were alive. Then the income paid to the annuitants would be too high and would
gradually decline, as fewer people died than expected meaning that too much money was paid out.
Thus fewer than kU people would receive a stable, lifelong income for some given level of certainty
since the declining income would breach the lower income threshold earlier than anticipated.
If instead more people died than suggested by the future lifetime distribution used to calculate
the annuity payments, then less income is paid out than expected. In that case, more than kU
people would receive a stable, lifelong income, because more people die earlier - thus getting a
lifelong income over a shorter lifetime - and there is more money for the longer-lived.
As the focus of this paper is idiosyncratic longevity risk, the quantification of the effect of
systematic longevity risk on the results requires a further study. This is important so that how
the annuitants’ income may vary over their lifetime is understood better, thus allowing the pooled
annuity fund to meet the needs and expectations of annuitants.
Acknowledgments
Research for this paper was undertaken as part of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ ARC
research programme “Minimising Longevity and Investment Risk while Optimising Future Pension
Plans”, for which funding is gratefully acknowledged by the authors. The authors thank three
anonymous reviewers and the Editor, Prof. Dr Wu¨thrich, for criticisms and suggestions which
have undoubtedly improved the paper immensely.
23
References
Bengen, W. (2001). Conserving client portfolios during retirement, Part IV. Journal of Financial
Planning, 5:110–119.
Billingsley, P. (1999). Convergence of Probability Measures. Wiley Series in Probability and Statis-
tics. Wiley, 3rd edition.
Birnbaum, Z. and Lientz, B. (1969). Exact distributions for some Re´nyi-type statistics. Applica-
tiones Mathematicae, 10:179–192.
Bruhn, K. and Steffensen, M. (2013). Optimal smooth consumption and annuity design. Journal
of Banking and Finance, 37:2693–2701.
Chen, A., Hieber, P., and Klein, J. K. (2019). Tonuity: A novel individual-oriented retirement
plan. ASTIN Bulletin, 49(1):5–30.
Chen, A. and Rach, M. (2019). Options on tontines: An innovative way of combining tontines and
annuities. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 89:182–192.
Constantinides, G. (1990). Habit formation: A resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Journal
of Political Economy, 98:519–543.
Continuous Mortality Investigation (2008). S1PFL. Technical report, Institute and Faculty of Ac-
tuaries, UK. Data downloaded at https://www.actuaries.org.uk/learn-and-develop/continuous-
mortality-investigation/cmi-mortality-and-morbidity-tables/s1-series-tables on 28 Sept 2019.
Cso¨rgo¨, M. (1965). Exact probability distribution functions of some Re´nyi type statistics. Pro-
ceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 16(6):1158–1167.
Curatola, G. (2017). Optimal portfolio choice with loss aversion over consumption. The Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance, 66:345–358.
Devroye, L. (1986). Non-Uniform Random Variate Generation. Springer-Verlag New York.
Donnelly, C. (2015). Actuarial fairness and solidarity in pooled annuity funds. ASTIN Bulletin,
45(1):49–74.
Donnelly, C., Guille´n, M., and Nielsen, J. (2014). Bringing cost transparency to the life annuity
market. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 56:14–27.
Donnelly, C. and Young, J. (2017). Product options for enhanced retirement income. British
Actuarial Journal, 22(3):636–656.
Donsker, M. (1952). Justification and extension of Doob’s heuristic approach to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov theorems. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 23(2):277–281.
Forman, J. and Sabin, M. (2015). Tontine pensions. University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
163(3):755–831.
Guyton, J. (2004). Decision rules and portfolio management for retirees: is the ‘safe’ initial
withdrawal rate too safe? Journal of Financial Planning, pages 54–62. October 2004.
Guyton, J. and Klinger, W. (2006). Decision rules and maximum initial withdrawal rates. Journal
of Financial Planning, pages 50–58.
24
He, L. and Liang, Z. (2013). Optimal dynamic asset allocation strategy for ELA scheme of DC
pension plan during the distribution phase. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 52(2):404–
410.
Human Mortality Database (2018). United Kingdom, Life tables (period 1x1), Total (both sexes).
Technical report, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demo-
graphic Research (Germany). Data downloaded at https://www.mortality.org on the 28/09/2019.
Karatzas, I. and Shreve, S. (1988). Brownian motion and stochastic calculus. Springer-Verlag.
Kerman, J. (2011). A closed-form approximation for the median of the Beta distribution. Available
at arXiv. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1111.0433.
Milevsky, M. and Salisbury, T. (2015). Optimal retirement income tontines. Insurance: Mathe-
matics and Economics, 64:91–105.
Milevsky, M. A. and Salisbury, T. S. (2016). Equitable retirement income tontines: Mixing cohorts
without discriminating. ASTIN Bulletin, 46(3):571–604.
Munk, C. (2008). Portfolio and consumption choice with stochastic investment opportunities and
habit formation in preference. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(11):3560–3589.
Pfau, W. and Kitces, M. (2014). Reducing retirement risk with a rising equity glide path. Journal
of Financial Planning, 27:38–45.
Piggott, P., Valdez, E., and Detzel, B. (2005). The simple analytics of a pooled annuity fund. The
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72(3):497–520.
Qiao, C. and Sherris, M. (2013). Managing systematic mortality risk with group self-pooling and
annuitization schemes. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 80(4):949–974.
Sabin, M. (2010). Fair tontine annuity. Available at SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1579932.
Shorack, G. and Wellner, J. (2009). Empirical Processes with Applications to Statistics. SIAM.
Stamos, M. Z. (2008). Optimal consumption and portfolio choice for pooled annuity funds. Insur-
ance: Mathematics and Economics, 43:56–68.
Valdez, E. A., Piggott, J., and Wang, L. (2006). Demand and adverse selection in a pooled annuity
fund. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 39(2):251–266.
Van Bilsen, S., Laeven, R., and Nijman, T. (2020). Consumption and portfolio choice under loss
aversion and endogenous updating of the reference level. Management Science. In press.
Vrbik, J. (2018). Small-sample corrections to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. Pioneer Journal
of Theoretical and Applied Statistics, 15(1-2):15–23.
Work and Pensions Committee (2018). Pension freedoms. Technical report, House of Commons
(United Kingdom). Ninth Report of Session 2017-19, HC917.
25
Appendix
A. Derivation
Claim A.1. For the order statistics (U(i))Ni=1 of N independent and standard uniformly distributed
random variables, certainty β ∈ [0, 1], and threshold parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), let kU ≤ N be the last
integer that fulfills
P
[
(1− ε) i−1N + ε ≥ U(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
] ≥ β
For u ≥ 0, let bucN = max{i/N : i/N ≤ u and i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N ]}}, and let Φ−1 be the inverse of
the standard normal distribution function Φ. Then kU can be calculated approximately from
1− kU
N
≈
 11− ε
1− 1
1 + 1N
( 1−ε
ε
)2 (Φ−1 ( 1−β2 ))2


N
.
Derivation of claim. Assume that both the time of deaths of members and payment times to
surviving members are reasonably dense in time so that from (6) in the proof of Theorem 3.1,
P
[
inf
s∈[0,T(kU ))
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε
]
≥ β
is approximately equivalent to
P
[
inf
s∈[0,t]
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε
]
≥ β, with t ≈ T(k).
Using FˆN (s) = 1− spˆx and F (s) = 1− spx from the proof of Theorem 3.1,
β = P
[
spx
spˆx
≥ 1− ε, ∀ s ≤ t
]
=P
[
1− F (s)
1− FˆN (s)
≥ 1− ε, ∀ s ≤ t
]
=P
[
ε
1− ε ≥
F (s)− FˆN (s)
1− F (s) , ∀ s ≤ t
]
.
It is more convenient to look at the complementary probability, i.e.
1− β = P
[
∃ s ≤ t : ε1− ε <
F (s)− FˆN (s)
1− F (s)
]
= P
[
ε
1− ε < sups≤t
F (s)− FˆN (s)
1− F (s)
]
.
Let F−1 be the generalized inverse of F . Re-writing the above expression in a form amenable to
applying well-known results from the literature yields
1− β = P
[
ε
1− ε < supu≤F (t)
u− FˆN (F−1(u))
1− u
]
. (17)
One of the early versions of Donsker’s theorem states that the process u 7→ √N(u− FˆN (F−1(u)))
converges in distribution for N → ∞ to a Brownian bridge (Donsker, 1952). However, applying
this theorem to (17) yields an approximation that noticeably underestimates the true value. The
issue seems to be that the discontinuous jump-processes (FˆN )∞N=1 are approximated by a contin-
uous Brownian bridge. Heuristically, a continuous process should be a better fit for a continuous
process than a discontinuous one. In fact, the classical Donsker theorem is based on continuous
interpolations of random variables (Billingsley, 1999).
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Let Fˆ cn be the process that continuously interpolates the jumps of Fˆn for given n. Then Fˆ cn ≥ Fˆn
are functions on the real line. This leads to a smaller supremum and, in turn, to an under-estimation
of (17) when Fˆn is replaced with its continuous version Fˆ cn in (17).
One way to compensate for this under-estimation when using the Brownian bridge is to enlarge
the set {u : u ≤ F (t)}. A similar argument has been used in Vrbik (2018) for small sample
corrections in the context of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Interestingly, there is an enlargement
that leaves the value of (17) almost unchanged: let y be the value of the last jump of FˆN (F−1(u))
in {u : u ≤ F (t)}. Assume that ε/(1− ε) hasn’t been crossed so far (the other case doesn’t change
the outcome of the inequality in (17) for any enlargement). Then
ε
1− ε ≥
u− y
1− u for u ≤ F (t).
Rearranging the inequality and using y ≈ F (t) gives
ε+ (1− ε)y ≥ u, or ε+ (1− ε)F (t) ≥ u.
Hence, {u : u ≤ F (t)} can be approximately enlarged to {u : u ≤ ε+(1−ε)F (t)} without changing
the value in (17).
Overall, let B be a Brownian bridge in [0, 1], then
1− β ≈ P
[
ε
1− ε < supu≤ε+(1−ε)F (t)
B(u)√
N(1− u)
]
. (18)
The process u 7→ B(u)/(1− u) is a time-changed Brownian motion, as it is a continuous, zero-
mean, Gaussian process with covariance function (u, v) 7→ u/(1− u) for 0 ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1 (Karatzas
and Shreve, 1988, pp.103-104).
Then, letting W be a Brownian motion,
1− β ≈ P
[
ε
1− ε < supu≤ε+(1−ε)F (t)
W ( u1−u )√
N
]
= 2P
[√
N
ε
1− ε < W (
ε+(1−ε)F (t)
1−(ε+(1−ε)F (t)) )
]
= 2 Φ
(
−
√
1−(ε+(1−ε)F (t))
ε+(1−ε)F (t)
√
N
ε
1− ε
)
= 2 Φ
(
−
√
1
1−(1−ε)tpx − 1
√
N
ε
1− ε
)
.
Rearranging yields
tpx ≈ 11− ε
1− 1
1 + 1N
( 1−ε
ε
)2 (Φ−1 ( 1−β2 ))2
 .
Observe that tpx ≈ tpˆx ≈ T(kU ) pˆx = Lx+T(kU )/N = (N − kU )/N = 1 − kU/N . Hence, the claim
follows from tpx ≈ 1− kU/N together with kU ≤ N is an integer.
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